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Introduction
The agreement to establish a new Technology Mechanism is one of the 
concrete outcomes of the Cancun climate change conference (2010) that 
requires a closer look. The main goal of the Mechanism is to enhance 
action for technology development and transfer, particularly to developing 
countries, in support of climate change mitigation and adaptation. It is 
premised on the recognition that the large-scale deployment and diffusion 
of these technologies is pivotal to worldwide efforts to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. 
However, the Mechanism faces many challenges before it can become 
operational in 2012. For instance, it is not clear how well resourced it will 
be. In addition, many of its functions need to be further ‘fleshed out’ and 
a number of institutional issues such as the relationship between its two 
main components – the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate 
Technology Centre and Network – still need to be agreed. The objective of 
this information note is to shed some light on the main features and functions 
of the Technology Mechanism and on some of these challenges. 
1. The Technology Mechanism: Background and General 
Considerations
1.1 From Bali to Cancun: the Road towards Creating the Technology 
Mechanism 
Technology transfer has been a key objective of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) since its inception. Article 4.5 of 
the Convention requires developed countries to “take all practicable steps 
to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access 
to environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, 
particularly developing country parties to enable them to implement the 
provisions of the Convention”. Furthermore, Article 4.7 establishes a clear 
link between the extent to which developing countries will implement 
their commitments under the UNFCCC and the effective implementation by 
developed countries of their commitments relating to financial resources and 
the transfer of technology.
For many years, developing countries have been demanding concrete steps and 
measures to operationalize these provisions in a meaningful way. Developed 
countries, for their part, have pointed to the lack of enabling environments 
and limited absorptive capacities in recipient countries as the main barriers 
to technology transfer. Difficulties in reaching a common definition of 
technology transfer and disagreements over the role of intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) were recurrent issues in these discussions.
In 2007, the Bali Action Plan, agreed at the 13th Conference of the Parties 
(COP) of the UNFCCC, reaffirmed the centrality of technology development 
2and transfer. Article 1 makes it one of the four priority 
areas to be addressed in discussions aiming at the “full, 
effective and sustained implementation of the Convention 
through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and 
beyond 2012”. It called for: 
Enhanced action on technology development and 
transfer to support action on mitigation and adaptation, 
including, inter alia, consideration of: (i) Effective 
mechanisms and enhanced means for the removal 
of obstacles to, and provision of financial and other 
incentives for, scaling up of the development and 
transfer of technology to developing country Parties in 
order to promote access to affordable environmentally 
sound technologies (emphasis added).1 
In August 2008, the G77 group of developing countries 
and China presented a comprehensive proposal for 
a Technology Mechanism under the UNFCCC, which 
included a Multilateral Climate Technology Fund inspired 
by the experience of the Multilateral Fund for the 
Implementation of the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
That Deplete the Ozone Layer (1990).2 Intensive 
negotiations took place on the basis of this proposal and 
submissions made by other countries.3  
The Copenhagen Accord (2009) signalled the growing 
consensus on the creation of a Technology Mechanism, as 
signatories agreed to establish a “Technology Mechanism 
to accelerate technology development and transfer in 
support of action on adaptation and mitigation”.4 The 
Accord further specified that the Mechanism will “be 
guided by a country-driven approach and be based on 
national circumstances and priorities”.5 From Copenhagen 
to Cancun, parties further fleshed out the precise mandate, 
structures and functions of the new entity, though 
ultimately a number of issues, in particular institutional 
ones, remain unresolved and need to be settled by the 
Durban climate change conference in December 2011. 
Thus, the decision to create the Technology Mechanism 
at the Cancun Conference represents the culmination 
of a three-year negotiating process since COP 13 in 
Bali. Ultimately, the establishment of the Technology 
Mechanism represents a potentially positive development, 
particularly in view of the long-standing demands by 
developing countries for the institutional strengthening 
of the technology transfer ‘pillar’ under the UNFCCC. 
More broadly, it has the potential to become an important 
meeting point for developed and developing countries 
to work together in a positive spirit to accelerate the 
deployment and transfer of technologies for climate 
change mitigation and adaptation.
1.2 Some General Considerations 
The process leading to agreement on the establishment of 
a Technology Mechanism witnessed a vigorous debate that 
involved a number of arguments familiar to international 
discussions on technology transfer. This also took place in 
the shadow of an emerging ‘clean energy race’ between 
industrialized countries and a number of emerging 
economies such as China and India.
1.2.1 Technology transfer or technology diffusion?
In this context, industrialized countries and private 
sector organizations voiced their well-known misgivings 
during the negotiations about the concept of ‘technology 
transfer’, preferring the term ‘technology diffusion’. They 
consider the latter as reflecting real world dynamics more 
accurately, whereby technology is not simply ‘transferred’ 
from one entity, firm or institution, to the other but 
‘diffused’ through a variety of channels where markets and 
private firms play a key role.6 As underlined by the World 
Business Council on Sustainable Development, business 
“understands technology transfer to be technology 
diffusion, a means for the deployment of new equipment, 
products, processes or knowledge, previously not accessed 
by a recipient country”, adding that “the private sector 
diffuses technology on a commercial basis every day”.7 
For their part, developing countries have remained 
attached to the concept of ‘technology transfer’ enshrined 
in the UNFCCC. They also point out that a significant share 
of clean energy technologies are developed by public 
institutions – such as public research centres and scientific 
institutions – using public funding, thus dispelling the 
argument that technology is solely in the hands of the 
private sector.
Against this background, it is interesting to note that 
the entity created at Cancun is ultimately a ‘Technology 
Mechanism’ and not a ‘Technology Transfer Mechanism.’ 
It should also be noted that previous significant COP 
decisions on technology transfer, in 2002 (4/CP.7) and 2007 
(4/CP.13), include a reference at the outset to chapter 34 
1 Paragraph 1(d), Bali Action Plan, UNFCCC (2007).
2 G77 & China (2008). 
3 Seligsohn et al. (2009). 
4 Abdel Latif (2010).
5 Paragraph 11, Copenhagen Accord, UNFCCC (2009).
6 However, it is interesting to note that the terminology of ‘transfer of technology’ is often used in developed countries. In the US, for example, the National 
Technology Transfer and Advancement Act, or NTTAA, United States Public Law 104-113, was signed into law on 7 March 1996.
7 WBCSD (2010).
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3of Agenda 21 (1992) on the transfer of environmentally 
sound technologies (ESTs), whereas the decision creating 
the Technology Mechanism does not and only refers to the 
relevant provisions of the UNFCCC.
1.2.2 The shadow of the ‘clean energy race’
In the course of climate negotiations, industrialized 
countries began to increasingly perceive emerging 
economies such as China, India and Brazil as competitors 
in the ‘clean energy race’.
In September 2010, the US Steelworkers Union filed a 
trade complaint against China with the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR), accusing it of 
unfairly subsidizing its clean energy industry. The Union 
highlighted several areas of policies used by China that 
they consider violate WTO free trade rules.8 
In November 2010, US Energy Secretary Steven Chu said 
that the success of China and other countries in clean 
energy industries represented a new “Sputnik Moment” 
for the US, and required a similar mobilization of 
American innovation.9 In his State of the Union Speech in 
January 2011, President Obama used the same analogy to 
the “Sputnik moment” in his call to encourage American 
innovation in clean energy.10 
In this context, industrialized countries, particularly 
the US, became wary of concessions in the technology 
discussions which could adversely impact their 
competitiveness. These concerns, in particular regarding 
China’s growing technological capabilities and ‘indigenous 
innovation’ policies, cast a shadow over the global 
negotiations on the transfer of clean energy technologies 
in the run up to Cancun. 
1.2.3  Addressing the diversity of technological needs and 
capabilities
Another challenge in the technology discussions concerned 
how to meet the diversity of technological ‘needs’, 
as technologies tend to be country and sector specific. 
This diversity makes it particularly challenging to devise 
effective international arrangements that can address the 
needs of a large heterogeneous grouping of ‘developing 
countries’, which in reality encompasses middle-income 
countries – with advanced technological capabilities – but 
also a large number of Least Developed Countries (LDCs). 
As a result, the decision creating the Technology 
Mechanism underlines that “technology needs must be 
nationally determined, based on national circumstances 
and priorities”.11 References to national needs, 
circumstances and country-driven approaches are 
recurrent throughout the mandate to ensure the primacy 
of national needs and country ownership in guiding the 
work of the Mechanism.12  
In addition, special consideration is given to LDCs in 
the mandate of the TEC, one of the Mechanism’s two 
main bodies, in relation to its role in “recommending 
guidance on policies and programme priorities related 
to technology development and transfer”.13 This might 
stem from a feeling that negotiations at one point 
were paying more attention to the needs of middle-
income countries and mitigation technologies and not 
sufficiently to LDCs and adaptation technologies.
1.2.4 Deadlock on intellectual property rights
The issue of IPRs was one of the most divisive in the 
technology negotiations, if not the most divisive. Up 
to Cancun, developing countries had pressed for the 
consideration of IPRs as one of the possible barriers 
to technology transfer. However, developed countries 
opposed such a view, given the essential role they 
consider that IPR protection plays in providing incentives 
for innovation in clean technologies. A ‘polarized’ 
debate followed, in which there was little chance for 
meaningful discussion based on evidence rather than 
rhetoric.14 As a result, all the language on IPRs remained 
bracketed during negotiations and, ultimately, there 
was no reference to IPRs in the final text of the Cancun 
Agreements. 
After a meeting of BASIC countries – Brazil, South Africa, 
India and China – in New Delhi in February 2011 to 
assess the outcome of the Cancun meeting, the Indian 
Minister of Environment indicated that “there were 
a number of issues in the Bali Road Map that had not 
been presented in the Cancun agreements, in particular 
the issue of equity, intellectual property rights and 
trade which are all very important to BASIC countries”. 
“We will make every effort to bring these issues back to 




11 Paragraph 114, Cancun Agreements, UNFCCC (2010a).
12 Ibid., e.g. paragraph 116. 
13 Ibid., paragraph 121(c).
14 For empirical evidence in this area, see UNEP, EPO & ICTSD (2010).
15 Xinhua News (2011).
42. Mandate, Structure and Functions of 
the Technology Mechanism 
2.1  Mandate 
Provisions relating to the establishment of the Technology 
Mechanism are contained in Section IV B of Decision 1/
CP.16 of COP 16 on the Outcome of the work of the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on long-term Cooperative Action (AWG 
LCA) (hereinafter the “Cancun Agreements”).16 
According to paragraph 117, the COP decides to establish a 
Technology Mechanism to “facilitate the implementation 
of actions for achieving the objective referred to in 
paragraphs 113-115”. In this regard, the “objective 
of enhanced action on technology development and 
transfer, is to support action on mitigation and adaptation 
in order to achieve the full implementation of the 
Convention”.17 The COP also decides “to accelerate action 
consistent with international obligations, at different 
stages of the technology cycle, including research and 
development, demonstration, deployment, diffusion and 
transfer of technology in support of action on mitigation 
and adaptation”.18  
It is interesting to note that the Technology Mechanism 
is ultimately placed “under the guidance of the COP” 
(paragraph 117). This had been one of the sticking 
points in negotiations after Copenhagen, as developing 
countries favoured having the Mechanism under the 
‘authority’ of the COP in order to give the COP a stronger 
oversight role.
In general, the wording of the Technology Mechanism’s 
mandate appears rather intricate and convoluted 
compared to previous formulations in the negotiations. 
It aims now primarily to “facilitate the implementation 
of actions” and “to accelerate action consistent with 
international obligations” at different stages of the 
technology cycle. This stands in contrast to the more 
direct and assertive wording in previous drafts – as well 
as in the Copenhagen Accord – whereby the Mechanism 
aimed simply “to accelerate technology development 
and transfer in support of action on adaptation and 
mitigation” (emphasis added).
2.2 Priority Areas 
After specifying the mandate of the Technology 
Mechanism, the COP’s decision lists a number of ‘priority 
areas’ to be considered under the Convention (See Box 
1 below). 
Of these seven priority areas, three appear to be 
of particular significance for the future work of the 
Technology Mechanism. 
The first priority area – the development of endogenous 
capacities including cooperative research, development 
and demonstration programmes – has been recurrently 
mentioned in previous UNFCCC COP decisions.19 The 
key question remains how to foster cooperative 
research and development (R&D) programmes in which 
developing countries can participate more effectively. 
In this regard, the Expert Group on Technology Transfer 
(EGTT) has recently elaborated a number of options 
to facilitate collaborative research and development 
based on a review of existing collaborative technology 
research and development activities, which will require 
further consideration.20  
16 UNFCCC (2010a). 
17 Ibid., paragraph 113.
18 Ibid., paragraph 115.
19 For instance, in 2001, the Marrakesh Accords stated in Decision 4/CP.7, paragraph 14(c), that: “All Parties are urged to promote joint research and 
development programmes, as appropriate, both bilaterally and multilaterally” (UNFCCC, 2001).
20 EGTT (2010).
Source: Paragraph 120, Cancun Agreements, UNFCCC (2010a).
Box 1: Priority Areas for Enhanced Action on Technology Development and Transfer
(a) Development and enhancement of endogenous capacities and technologies of developing country Parties, 
including cooperative research, development and demonstration programmes;
(b) Deployment and diffusion of environmentally sound technologies and know-how in developing country 
Parties;
(c) Increased public and private investment in technology development, deployment, diffusion and transfer;
(d) Deployment of soft and hard technologies for the implementation of adaptation and mitigation actions;
(e) Improved climate change observation systems and related information management;
(f) Strengthening of national systems of innovation and technology innovation centres;
(g) Development and implementation of national technology plans for mitigation and adaptation;
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521 OECD (2010).
22 WHO (2008).
23 Kraemer-Mbula & Maharajh (2010). See also the Science, Technology and Innovation Policy Reviews (STIPs) conducted by UNCTAD (n.d.).
24 Cannady (2009).
25 Chung (2008).
The priority area relating to “strengthening of national 
systems of innovation and technology innovation 
centres” is of importance, as this may be the first time 
that the concept of ‘innovation’ has been given such a 
prominent standing in UNFCCC decisions on technology 
transfer. In recent years, a number of international 
fora have increasingly been turning their attention to 
harnessing innovation in order to achieve economic 
prosperity and address global challenges. Examples 
include the OECD Innovation Strategy (2010)21 and 
the WHO Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public 
Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property (2008).22 
The establishment and strengthening of national 
systems of innovation has often been at the heart of 
these discussions.23 In the course of the climate change 
negotiations, there has been an increasing emphasis 
on the need to better integrate this dimension into 
the emerging climate-related technology transfer 
architecture.24 However, it should be noted that this 
reference to the ‘strengthening of national systems of 
innovation’ ultimately stops short of mentioning that 
this should occur specifically in developing countries.
The “development and implementation of national 
technology plans for mitigation and adaptation” 
reflects the keenness of parties to move beyond 
technology needs assessments. These had been an 
important element of the technology work programme 
under the UNFCCC for many years. However, there was 
a feeling, particularly among developing countries, 
that they should not be an end in themselves and 
that a more dynamic approach, embodied in national 
technology plans, should be promoted to complement 
and build upon them.
Interestingly, the role of publicly funded ESTs is not 
specifically highlighted on its own among the priority 
areas mentioned above (nor among the functions of the 
Technology Mechanism’s main components ). It is important 
to recall, in this regard, that this issue has traditionally been 
the subject of attention in climate change discussions on 
technology transfer going as far back as Agenda 21 (1992), 
which stipulated that: “Governments and international 
organizations should promote the formulation of policies 
and programmes for the effective transfer of ESTs that are 
publicly owned or in the public domain”.
Such special attention is based on the premise that the 
share of publicly funded R&D is particularly significant 
in climate change technologies, as the initial viability of 
ESTs tends to be low. Proposals have been made during 
the course of the technology transfer negotiations to 
harness the potential of publicly funded ESTs through 
partnerships between developed and developing 
countries, as well as by looking into possibilities around 
pooling, sharing and exchanging publicly funded R&D.25 
Yet the absence of any specific recognition of the role 
of publicly funded technologies in technology transfer 
is revealing of the relative success of industrialized 
countries in advancing the argument that technology is 
solely in private hands, which tends to evade altogether 
the important contribution of publicly funded 
technologies. 
2.3 Structure
The Technology Mechanism consists of two components: 
the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the 
Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). Both 
should “facilitate the effective implementation of 
the Technology Mechanism, under the guidance of the 
Conference of the Parties”. Figure 1 provides an overview 
of the Mechanism’s structure and of the functions of its 
main components. These functions will be examined in 
more detail in the following sub-sections. 
62.2.1 The Technology Executive Committee 
The mandate and the composition of the TEC are contained 
in Annex IV of the Cancun AWG LCA decision (attached as 
an Annex). According to it, the TEC shall be comprised 
of twenty experts, elected by the COP, serving in their 
personal capacity and nominated by Parties. In order to 
achieve a fair and balanced representation, it is specified 
that nine should come from Annex I countries, three from 
each of the three regions of the parties not included in 
Annex I (Africa; Asia and the Pacific; and Latin America 
and the Caribbean), one member from a Small Island 
Developing State and one from an LDC.
The decisions of the TEC will be taken by consensus. 
In terms of its modus operandi, the TEC “should draw 
upon outside expertise, including the UNFCCC roster of 
experts and the Climate Technology Centre and Network, 
to provide advice”. The TEC “should seek input from 
intergovernmental and international organizations and 
the private sector and may seek input from civil society 
in undertaking its work”. Its meetings “shall be open to 
attendance by accredited observer organizations, except 
where otherwise decided by the TEC” (emphasis added).
The TEC’s ability to draw on ‘outside expertise’ is certainly 
a positive feature, as this ensures that it can avail itself of 
the highest expertise in carrying out its functions. Seeking 
input from the private sector is logical in light of its 
important role in developing and diffusing technologies.
Indeed, the effectiveness of the Technology Mechanism 
will be contingent on the involvement of a wide range of 
stakeholders, in particular the private sector. While there 
might be some scepticism among businesses regarding 
the effectiveness of international arrangements in 
encouraging technology diffusion, meaningful contribution 
to the Mechanism’s activities could provide a valuable 
opportunity for the private sector to show its commitment 
to combating climate change through technology diffusion 
beyond a ‘business as usual approach’.
The TEC’s functions are listed in Box 2. 
Figure 1. Structure of the Technology Mechanism
Source: ICTSD
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7Of the TEC’s seven functions, three pertain to ‘making 
recommendations’. Among these three, the most 
general one concerns recommending “actions to 
promote technology development and transfer in order 
to accelerate action on mitigation and adaptation” 
(function (b)). Basically almost anything can fall under 
this heading.
The TEC can also recommend “guidance on policies and 
programme priorities related to technology development 
and transfer with special consideration given to [LDCs]” 
(function (c)). In addition, it can “recommend actions 
to address the barriers to technology development 
and transfer in order to enable enhanced action on 
mitigation and adaptation” (function (e)).
Apart from making recommendations, the TEC can 
provide an “overview of technological needs” and 
“analysis of policy and technical issues” (function (a)) 
and “catalyse the development and use of technology 
road maps or action plans […] including the development 
of best practice guidelines as facilitative tools for action 
on mitigation and adaptation” (function (g)).
A number of elements remain unclear from this wording: 
is the “overview of technological needs” by the TEC at 
the national, regional or international level? How can 
the TEC concretely “catalyse” the technology road 
maps or action plans?
On the whole, the wording of all these functions 
is quite general and gives quite a large latitude and 
discretionary power to the TEC to define the scope of 
its responsibilities, the range of its activities and the 
manner in which it will carry them out. For instance, 
the TEC could itself make a determination as to what 
constitute “barriers” to technology development and 
transfer. 
Overall, the TEC’s primary focus appears to be to 
service the UNFCCC and its Parties. Its main functions, 
particularly in making recommendations and providing 
an overview of technological needs, are close to those 
of a policy ‘oversight’ body, as it would have been 
originally intended to be.
2.2.2 The Climate Technology Centre and Network
The objective of the Climate Technology Centre (CTC) 
is to “facilitate a Network of national, regional, sectoral 
and international technology networks, organizations and 
initiatives with a view to engaging the participants of the 
Network in a number of functions”. These functions are 
listed in Box 3.
Source: Paragraph 121, Cancun Agreements, UNFCCC (2010a).
Box 2: Functions of the Technology Executive Committee
(a) Provide an overview of technological needs and analysis of policy and technical issues related to the development 
and transfer of technology for mitigation and adaptation;
(b) Consider and recommend actions to promote technology development and transfer in order to accelerate 
action on mitigation and adaptation;
(c) Recommend guidance on policies and programme priorities related to technology development and transfer 
with special consideration given to the least developed country Parties;
(d) Promote and facilitate collaboration on the development and transfer of technology for mitigation and 
adaptation between governments, the private sector, non-profit organizations and academic and research 
communities;
(e) Recommend actions to address the barriers to technology development and transfer in order to enable enhanced 
action on mitigation and adaptation;
(f) Seek cooperation with relevant international technology initiatives, stakeholders and organizations, promote 
coherence and cooperation across technology activities, including activities under and outside of the 
Convention;
(g) Catalyse the development and use of technology road maps or action plans at international, regional and 
national levels through cooperation between relevant stakeholders, particularly governments and relevant 
organizations or bodies, including the development of best practice guidelines as facilitative tools for action 
on mitigation and adaptation;
826 An example of a network of international technology and research centres is the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
(CGIAR). See Correa (2009).
27 UNFCCC (2010b).  
28 See for instance draft decision D.-/CP.15 on Enhanced action on technology development and transfer, Paragraphs 6 (m) and 15 (g), (UNFCCC, 2010c).
Source: Paragraph 123, Cancun Agreements, UNFCCC (2010a). 
Box 3: Functions of the Climate Technology Network
(a) At the request of a developing country Party:
(i)  Provide advice and support related to the identification of technology needs and the implementation of 
environmentally sound technologies, practices and processes;
(ii)  Facilitate the provision of information, training and support for programmes to build or strengthen 
developing country capacity to identify technology options, make technology choices and operate, maintain 
and adapt technology;
(iii) Facilitate prompt action on the deployment of existing technology in developing country Parties based on 
identified needs;
(b) Stimulate and encourage, through collaboration with the private sector, public institutions, academia 
and research institutions, the development and transfer of existing and emerging environmentally sound 
technologies, as well as opportunities for North/South, South/South and triangular technology cooperation;
(c) Facilitate a Network of national, regional, sectoral and international technology centres, networks, organizations 
and initiatives with a view to:
(i)  Enhancing cooperation with national, regional and international technology centres and relevant national 
institutions;
(ii)  Facilitating international partnerships among public and private stakeholders to accelerate the innovation 
and diffusion of environmentally sound technologies to developing country Parties;
(iii) Providing, on request by a developing country Party, in-country technical assistance and training to support 
identified technology actions in developing country Parties;
(iv) Stimulating the establishment of twinning centre arrangements to promote North/South, South/South and 
triangular partnerships with a view to encouraging cooperative research and development; 
(v) Identify, disseminate and assist with developing analytical tools, policies and best practices for country-
driven planning to support the dissemination of environmentally sound technologies;
(d) Performing other such activities as may be necessary to carry out its functions;
Of the CTC’s three main functions, the most novel and 
challenging one is no doubt to “facilitate a Network of 
national, regional, sectoral and international technology 
centres, networks, organization and initiatives”.26  
The negotiating text for the UNFCCC Tianjin meeting, in 
October 2010, just prior to Cancun, stated that the CTC 
would “establish and facilitate” a Climate Technology 
Network (emphasis added).27 The elimination of the 
term ‘establish’ from the final Cancun Agreements is 
significant. The creation or establishment of a network 
of regional innovation centres with the aim of accelera-
ting the diffusion of climate-friendly technologies was 
considered during the pre-Cancun negotiations as one 
of the concrete new measures that the Technology 
Mechanism would bring about.28 Actually, much of the 
value added of the Technology Mechanism was seen to 
lie in the creation of a network of regional innovation 
centres. 
In addition, it should also be noted, that there is 
ultimately no explicit reference in the Cancun final 
decision to supporting clean energy innovation strategies 
and efforts in or by developing countries per se, among 
the functions of the TEC or the CTCN.  It is mentioned 
that the Climate Technology Network is to facilitate 
“international partnerships among public and private 
stakeholders to accelerate the innovation and diffusion 
of environmentally sound technologies to developing 
country Parties” (emphasis added). However, fostering 
partnerships to accelerate innovation and diffusion of 
ESTs to developing countries doesn’t necessarily amount 
to supporting clean energy innovation in or by these 
countries, particularly in the absence of any reference 
to the creation of national or regional technology 
innovation centres.
Thus the fact that the CTC is now confined to only 
facilitate a “network of national, regional, sectoral and 
international technology centres” marks a scaling down 
of ambition compared to the original intent. This change 
might stem from concerns about the cost implications 
associated with the creation of new entities and a 
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929 See the Oxford English Dictionary, available online at: http://oxforddictionaries.com/.
30 UNEP, NREL & ECN (2010).
desire to take greater advantage of existing institutions 
and centres. 
The term ‘facilitate’ is also not devoid of ambiguity as 
to what it exactly entails. The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines ‘facilitate’ as to ‘make easy or easier’.29 The 
‘facilitation’ function could mean that the Network 
would essentially act as a coordinator and a catalyst 
between a wide range of existing actors and stakeholders 
in carrying out the functions listed under paragraph (c) of 
its mandate. In any case, a number of questions remain 
as to how the facilitation of the Network would take 
place concretely, where the CTC would be hosted and 
which entities could become members of the Network. 
Some useful exploratory work has been done in this area 
which could be built upon.30 
Interestingly, a reference to South-South cooperation is 
made in two instances in the Network’s mandate, reflecting 
the importance of the technological capabilities acquired 
by emerging countries such as China, India and Brazil from 
which other developing countries and LDCs can benefit.
Apart from the facilitation of the abovementioned 
Network, the other important function of the Network 
is to provide advice and support to developing countries 
based on their request to: (i) identify technology needs; 
(ii) facilitate the provision of information, training 
and support; and (iii) facilitate prompt action on the 
deployment of existing technology in developing country 
parties based on identified needs.
In this regard, the CTCN can play a valuable role in 
providing neutral and impartial advice to developing 
countries about available clean energy technologies, 
which of them would be the most suitable for their needs 
and circumstances, and how to ensure their prompt 
deployment. This is of particular importance in view of the 
fact that a range of commercial interests are promoting 
their respective technologies (wind, solar, nuclear, etc.) 
to many developing countries which often do not have 
sufficient expertise to make informed choices about which 
technology is best suited to their needs. 
In this context, the provision by CTCN of information on 
technologies appears to be another key element in 
enabling developing countries to identify technology 
options and make appropriate technology choices. This 
information should include technologies protected  by 
IPRs as well as those in the public domain. In recent 
years, a number of platforms and research tools have 
been developed to provide easier access to patent 
information relating to clean energy technologies. The 
new patent classification developed by the European 
Patent Office (EPO) in the context of a joint project 
with UNEP and ICTSD, which provides simplified and 
free access to all patent documents related to clean 
energy technologies worldwide, is a prime example.
Overall, the CTCN’s primary focus is to provide services 
to developing countries. However, there are also some 
possible overlaps between some of the functions of the 
TEC and of the CTCN in relation to promoting technology 
collaboration with a range of stakeholders. For instance, 
the TEC can “promote and facilitate collaboration on the 
development and transfer of technology for mitigation 
and adaptation between governments, the private sector, 
non-profit organizations and academic and research 
communities” (function (d)) and similarly the CTCN can 
“promote and facilitate collaboration on the development 
and transfer of technology for mitigation and adaptation 
between governments, the private sector, non-profit 
organizations and academic and research communities” 
(function (b)). For this reason, the reference to the need 
for coherence and synergy between the two bodies is 
important (paragraph 127 of the Cancun Agreements).
3. Next Steps and Challenges Ahead
There are a number of steps to be taken and challenges 
to address in order to make the Mechanism operational 
and effective.
3.1 Next Steps
According to the Cancun decision, the Technology 
Mechanism should be fully operational in 2012. The TEC 
should convene its first meeting “as soon as practicable” 
following the election of its members and elaborate its 
modalities and procedures for consideration by the COP 
at its 17th session in Durban in December 2011.
The Cancun decision also establishes a work programme 
for the AWG LCA, in 2011, on technology development 
and transfer. The work programme calls for continued 
dialogue among parties on a number of matters with 
a view to the COP taking a decision in Durban. These 
matters include:
(a) The relationship between the TEC and the CTCN, and 
their reporting lines;
(b) The governance structure and terms of reference for 
the CTCN and how the Climate Technology Centre 
will relate to the Network;
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(c) The procedure for calls for proposals and the criteria 
to be used to evaluate and select the host of the 
CTCN;
(d) The potential links between the Technology Mechanism 
and the financial mechanism;
(e) Consideration of additional functions for the TEC and 
the CTCN.
The Cancun decision also envisages the convening of an 
expert workshop in 2011, in conjunction with one of the 
AWG LCA sessions, to examine these matters, drawing 
upon the preliminary work undertaken by the EGTT. 
Discussions on point (b) above should draw on the results 
of this workshop,which has been scheduled for 4-5 April 
2011 in Bangkok.
3.2 Financing
The Mechanism needs to be endowed with sufficient 
resources if it is to play any meaningful role and make a 
‘real’ difference. In this regard, neither the quantity of 
resources it will be endowed with, nor its possible links 
with the Convention’s financial mechanisms, such as the 
new Green Climate Fund, are clear.
As mentioned above, the potential links between the 
Technology Mechanism and the financial mechanism is one 
of the issues to be discussed in the context of the 2011 
work programme of the AWG LCA.
In any case, movement on this front seems closely 
associated with progress on climate finance more 
generally, including the work of the Transitional 
Committee on the design of a Green Climate Fund.
3.3 Pending Institutional Issues
The relationship between the TEC and CTCN remains 
undefined and should be determined by COP 17 
in Durban.
It was initially envisaged that the TEC would oversee 
the work of the CTCN. The negotiating text considered 
at the Tianjin meeting prior to the Cancun conference 
stipulated that the TEC would “provide guidance to the 
Climate Technology Centre and Network with a view to 
aligning the activities of the Climate Technology Centre 
and Network with country-driven actions”.31 
Ultimately, this wording was not retained in the final text 
of the decision, as it seems there were apprehensions that 
the TEC could become a ‘politicized’ body that intervenes 
in technology matters.
The reasons for such apprehensions are not clear. As 
seen above, the nature of the TEC’s functions makes it 
a logical oversight body for the more technical CTCN. 
Furthermore, the fact that TEC decisions will be taken 
by consensus makes it difficult for any single group of 
members to direct the work of the TEC only according 
to its own interests or views.
In the absence of such an oversight function by the 
TEC over the CTCN, the two bodies would report 
separately to the Convention’s subsidiary bodies 
on their respective activities and the performance 
of their respective functions. This might result in 
some duplication, despite efforts to avoid it and the 
requirement that they promote coherence and synergy 
between their areas of work. 
In any case, the matter should be dealt with swiftly by 
the next climate change conference in Durban (2011) 
so as not hamper the future work of the Mechanism. 
4. Conclusion
Overall, the new Technology Mechanism potentially 
represents a step to move beyond the ‘conventional’ 
approach to technology transfer under the climate 
regime – based essentially on capacity building and 
technology needs assessments – to a more ‘dynamic’ one 
geared towards fostering public-private partnerships; 
promoting innovation; catalysing the use of technology 
road maps or action plans; mobilizing national, 
regional and international technology centres; and 
facilitating joint R&D activities. The task facing the 
Technology Mechanism is arduous. Governments and 
other stakeholders, especially the private sector, have 
an important role in ensuring its success. 
In this context, discussions on the road to COP 17 in 
Durban (December, 2011) will play a critical role in 
settling outstanding institutional matters relating to the 
design of the Technology Mechanism and in elaborating 
further the exact manner in which its main bodies will 
operate. Concomitant deliberations on finance will also 
be essential in ensuring the Mechanism’s future viability. 
The success of these discussions will put the Mechanism 
on solid ground in order for it to be operational in 2012, 
and more importantly to become an integrated and 
coherent entity which is both flexible in its design and 
operations and effective in carrying out its tasks. 
31 UNFCCC (2010b).
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Annex –Decision 1/CP.16
The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the 
Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-term Cooperative Action Under the 
Convention
IV. B. Technology development and transfer 
Recalling the commitments under the Convention, in 
particular Article 4, paragraphs 1, 3, 5, 7, 8 and 9, 
Confirming the importance of promoting and enhancing 
national and international cooperative action on the 
development and transfer of environmentally sound 
technologies to developing country Parties to support 
action on mitigation and adaptation now, up to and 
beyond 2012, in order to achieve the ultimate objective 
of the Convention,
Recognizing that an early and rapid reduction in 
emissions and the urgent need to adapt to the adverse 
impacts of climate change require large-scale diffusion 
and transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound 
technologies,
Stressing the need for effective mechanisms, 
enhanced means, appropriate enabling environments 
and the removal of obstacles to the scaling up of the 
development and transfer of technology to developing 
country Parties:
113. Decides that the objective of enhanced action 
on technology development and transfer is to support 
action on mitigation and adaptation in order to achieve 
the full implementation of the Convention;
114. Also decides that, in pursuit of this objective, 
technology needs must be nationally determined, based 
on national circumstances and priorities;
115. Further decides to accelerate action consistent 
with international obligations, at different stages of the 
technology cycle, including research and development, 
demonstration, deployment, diffusion and transfer of 
technology (hereinafter referred in this decision as 
technology development and transfer) in support of 
action on mitigation and adaptation;
116. Encourages Parties, in the context of Article 4, 
paragraphs 1(c) and 5, of the Convention and consistent 
with their respective capabilities and national 
circumstances and priorities, to undertake domestic 
actions identified through country-driven approaches, 
to engage in bilateral and multilateral cooperative 
activities on technology development and transfer and to 
increase private and public research, development and 
demonstration in relation to technologies for mitigation 
and adaptation.
117. Decides to establish a Technology Mechanism to 
facilitate the implementation of actions for achieving the 
objective referred to in paragraphs 113–115 above, under 
the guidance of and accountable to the Conference of the 
Parties, which will consist of the following components:
(a)  A Technology Executive Committee, to undertake 
the functions contained in paragraph 121 below;
(b)  A Climate Technology Centre and Network, to 
undertake the functions contained in paragraph 123 
below;
118. Also decides that the Technology Executive 
Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and 
Network, consistent with their respective functions, 
should facilitate the effective implementation of the 
Technology Mechanism, under the guidance of the 
Conference of the Parties;
119. Further decides that the Technology Executive 
Committee shall further implement the framework 
for meaningful and effective actions to enhance the 
implementation of Article 4, paragraph 5, of the 
Convention adopted by decision 4/CP.7 and enhanced by 
decision 3/CP.13;
120. Decides that priority areas that could be considered 
under the Convention may include:
(a)  Development and enhancement of the endogenous 
capacities and technologies of developing 
country Parties, including cooperative research, 
development and demonstration programmes;
(b)  Deployment and diffusion of environmentally sound 
technologies and knowhow in developing country 
Parties;
(c)  Increased public and private investment in 
technology development, deployment, diffusion 
and transfer;
(d)  Deployment of soft and hard technologies for 
the implementation of adaptation and mitigation 
actions;
(e)  Improved climate change observation systems and 
related information management;
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(f)  Strengthening of national systems of innovation and 
technology innovation centres;
(g) Development and implementation of national 
technology plans for mitigation and adaptation.
121. Also decides that the functions of the Technology 
Executive Committee shall be to:
(a)  Provide an overview of technological needs and 
analysis of policy and technical issues related to 
the development and transfer of technologies for 
mitigation and adaptation;
(b) Consider and recommend actions to promote 
technology development and transfer, in order to 
accelerate action on mitigation and adaptation;
(c)  Recommend guidance on policies and programme 
priorities related to technology development and 
transfer with special consideration given to the 
least developed country Parties;
(d)  Promote and facilitate collaboration on the 
development and transfer of technologies for 
mitigation and adaptation between governments, 
the private sector, nonprofit organizations and 
academic and research communities;
(e) Recommend actions to address the barriers to 
technology development and transfer in order 
to enable enhanced action on mitigation and 
adaptation;
(f)  Seek cooperation with relevant international 
technology initiatives, stakeholders and 
organizations, and promote coherence and 
cooperation across technology activities, including 
activities under and outside of the Convention;
(g)  Catalyse the development and use of technology road 
maps or action plans at the international, regional 
and national levels through cooperation between 
relevant stakeholders, particularly governments 
and relevant organizations or bodies, including 
the development of best practice guidelines as 
facilitative tools for action on mitigation and 
adaptation.
122. Further decides that the Technology Executive 
Committee shall have the mandate and composition as 
contained in appendix IV to this decision;
123. Decides that the Climate Technology Centre shall 
facilitate a network of national, regional, sectoral and 
international technology networks, organizations and 
initiatives with a view to engaging the participants of 
the Network effectively in the following functions:
(a)  At the request of a developing country Party:
(i)  Providing advice and support related to the 
identification of technology needs and the 
implementation of environmentally sound 
technologies, practices and processes;
(ii)  Facilitating the provision of information, 
training and support for programmes to 
build or strengthen capacity of developing 
countries to identify technology options, 
make technology choices and operate, 
maintain and adapt technology;
(iii)  Facilitating prompt action on the deployment 
of existing technology in developing country 
Parties based on identified needs.
(b)  Stimulating and encouraging, through 
collaboration with the private sector, public 
institutions, academia and research institutions, 
the development and transfer of existing and 
emerging environmentally sound technologies, as 
well as opportunities for North–South, South–South 
and triangular technology cooperation;
(c)  Facilitating a network of national, regional, 
sectoral and international technology centres, 
networks, organization and initiatives with a view 
to:
(i)  Enhancing cooperation with national, regional 
and international technology centres and 
relevant national institutions;
(ii)  Facilitating international partnerships 
among public and private stakeholders to 
accelerate the innovation and diffusion 
of environmentally sound technologies to 
developing country Parties;
(iii)  Providing, at the request of a developing 
country Party, in-country technical assistance 
and training to support identified technology 
actions in developing country Parties;
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(iv)  Stimulating the establishment of twinning 
centre arrangements to promote North–South, 
South–South and triangular partnerships, with 
a view to encouraging cooperative research 
and development;
(v)  Identifying, disseminating and assisting with 
developing analytical tools, policies and 
best practices for country-driven planning to 
support the dissemination of environmentally 
sound technologies.
(d)  Performing other such activities as may be necessary 
to carry out its functions.
124. Also decides to terminate the mandate of the Expert 
Group on Technology Transfer at the conclusion of the 
sixteenth session of the Conference of the Parties;
125. Further decides that the Technology Executive 
Committee shall convene its first meeting as soon as 
practicable following the election of its members and 
shall elaborate its modalities and procedures taking 
into account the need to achieve coherence and 
maintain interactions with other relevant institutional 
arrangements under and outside of the Convention, for 
consideration by the Conference of the Parties at its 
seventeenth session;
126. Decides that the Technology Executive Committee 
and the Climate Technology Centre and Network shall 
report, on an interim basis and without prejudice to 
the relationship between the Technology Executive 
Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and 
Network as referred to in paragraph 128 (a) below to the 
Conference of the Parties, through the subsidiary bodies, 
on their respective activities and the performance of 
their respective functions;
127. Also decides that the Climate Technology Centre 
and Network and the Technology Executive Committee 
shall relate so as to promote coherence and synergy;
Work programme for the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention 
in 2011 on technology development and transfer
128. Underlines the importance of continued dialogue 
among Parties in 2011 through the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention, including on the following matters, with a 
view to the Conference of the Parties taking a decision 
at its seventeenth session, in order to make the 
Technology Mechanism fully operational in 2012:
(a)  The relationship between the Technology 
Executive Committee and the Climate Technology 
Centre and Network, and their reporting lines;
(b)  The governance structure of and terms of 
reference for the Climate Technology Centre and 
Network and how the Climate Technology Centre 
will relate to the Network, drawing upon the 
results of the workshop referred to in paragraph 
129 below;
(c)  The procedure for calls for proposals and the 
criteria to be used to evaluate and select the host 
of the Climate Technology Centre and Network;
(d)  The potential links between the Technology 
Mechanism and the financial mechanism;
(e)  Consideration of additional functions for the 
Technology Executive Committee and the Climate 
Technology Centre and Network.
129. Requests the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-
term Cooperative Action under the Convention to 
convene an expert workshop, in conjunction with one 
of its sessions in 2011, on the matters contained in 
paragraph 128 above, drawing upon the preliminary 
work undertaken by the Expert Group on Technology 
Transfer, and to report on the results of this workshop 
at that session.
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